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Abstract
We investigate the impact of a regulation policy imposed on an agent exploiting a pos-
sibly renewable natural resource. We adopt a principal-agent model in which the Principal
looks for a contract, i.e. taxes/compensations, leading the Agent to a certain level of ex-
ploitation. For a given contract, we first describe the Agent’s optimal harvest using the
BSDE theory. Under regularity and boundedness assumptions on the coefficients, we ex-
press almost optimal contracts as solutions to HJB equations. We then extend the result
to coefficients with less regularity and logistic dynamics for the natural resource. We end
by numerical examples to illustrate the impact of the regulation in our model.
Key words: Contract Theory, BSDEs, HJB PDE, Logistic SDE.
1 Introduction
The exploitation of natural resources is fundamental for the survival and development of the
growing human population. However, natural resources are limited since they are either non
renewable (e.g. minerals, oil, gas and coal) so that the available quantity is limited, or renewable
(e.g. food, water and forests) and in this case the natural resource is limited by its ability to
renew itself. In particular, an excessive exploitation of such resources might lead to their extinc-
tions and therefore affect the depending economies with, for instance, high increases of prices
and higher uncertainty on the future. Thus, the natural resource manager faces a dilemma:
either harvesting intensively the resource to increase her incomes, or taking into account the
potential externalities induced by an overexploitation of the resource and impacting her future
ability to harvest the resource. It has been nevertheless emphasized in [7] that in some cases
it is optimal for natural resource manager to harvest until the extinction of the resource. This
optimal harvesting strategy thus leads to costs for the global welfare related to the environment
degradation.
Therefore, the management and the monitoring of the exploitation of natural resources are
a balance between optimal harvest for the natural resource manager and ecological implications
for public organizations. This second issue has attracted a lot of interest, especially from
governance institutions. For example in its last annual report on sustainable development, the
statistical office of the European Union Eurostat dedicates a full section to the question of
sustainable consumption and production (see [11], Section 12).
The management of natural resources have also attracted a lot of interest from the academic
community. Many studies on natural resources exploitation tried to describe the possible effect
of economic incentives on the exploitation (see e.g. [5, 14, 26, 15]). These references stress
the need of an incentive policy to ensure the sustainability of the resource. However, even if
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the regulator have access to the abundance level of natural resource, the unobservability of
the natural resource manager behavior induces moral hazards. Thus, the regulator’s issue is
to incentivize the resource manager to optimally reduce the cost of the resource degradation,
together with ensuring a minimal incomes for the manager, under moral hazard. To the best
of our knowledge, this question has been addressed only in the discrete-time framework (see for
instance [13]) without considering any randomness in the dynamics of the resource. The aim of
this work is to investigate this problem in continuous time with randomness in the system.
To deal with this issue, we consider a principal-agent model under moral hazard. The first
elements of contract theory with moral hazard appeared in the 60’s with the articles [3, 29] in
which the mechanisms of controlled management were investigated. Then, it has been extended
and named as agency problem (see among others [28, 23]) by considering discrete-time models.
Concerning the continuous-time framework, the agency problem with moral hazard has been
first studied in [16] by modelling the uncertainty of risky incomes with a Brownian motion.
The agency problem can be roughly described as follows. We associate a moral hazard
problem with a Stackelberg game in which the leader (named the Principal) proposes at time
0 a compensation to the follower (named the Agent) given at a maturity T > 0 fixed by
the contract, to manage the wealth of the leader. Moreover, the Principal has to propose a
compensation high enough (called the reservation utility) to ensure a certain level of utility for
the Agent. Although the Principal cannot directly observe the action of the Agent, the former
can anticipate the best reaction effort of the latter with respect to a fixed compensation. Hence
the agency problem remains to design an optimal compensation proposed by the Principal to
the Agent given all the constraints mentioned above under moral hazard.
The common approach to solve this problem consists in proceeding in two steps. The first
step is to compute the optimal reaction of the Agent given a fixed compensation proposed by
the Principal, i.e. solving the utility maximization problem of the Agent. In all the papers
mentioned above, the shape of considered contracts is fundamental to solve the Agent problem
by assuming that the compensation is composed by
– a constant part depending on the reservation utility of the Agent,
– a part indexed by the (risky) incomes of the Principal,
– the certain equivalent gain of utility appearing in the Agent maximization.
Using the theory of Backward Stochastic Differential Equations (BSDE for short), [9] proved
that this class of smooth contracts, having a relevant economic interpretation, is not restrictive
to solve the agency problem. The second step consists in solving the Principal problem. Taking
into account this optimal reaction of the Agent, the goal is to compute the optimal compensa-
tion. As emphasized in [25] and then in [8, 9], this problem remains to a (classical) stochastic
control problem with the wealth of the Principal and the continuation utility value of the Agent
as state variables.
In this paper, we identify the natural resource manager as the Agent. The Principal refers to
a regulator, which can be a public institution that monitors the resource manager’s activities.
The resource manager can either harvest or renew the natural resource. In the first case the
production is sold at a given price on the market and in the second case the resource manager
pays for each unit of renewed natural resource. To regulate the natural resource exploitation,
the Principal imposes a tax/compensation to the Agent depending on the remaining level of
resource at the terminal time horizon. We suppose here that the Agent is risk-averse and we
model his preference with an exponential utility function1. For a given harvesting strategy, the
Agent total gain is composed by the cumulated amounts paid/earned by renewing/harvesting
the natural resource and the regulation compensation/tax. The Agent’s aim is then to maximize
the expected utility of his total gain over possible harvesting strategies.
On the other side, given the previous optimal harvest of the Agent, the regulator aims at
fixing a tax/compensation policy that incentives the Agent to let a reasonable remaining level
1See for instance [4] for more details on this kind of utility function and the economical interpretations of it.
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of natural resource. As a public institution, we assume that the regulator is risk-neutral.
The main features to model the dynamic of a renewable natural resource are its birth and
death rates and the inter-species competition. Besides, due to random evolution of the popu-
lation, we consider uncertainty in the available abundance. Following [12, 2, 21] we choose to
model the evolution of the natural resource by a stochastic logistic diffusion.
We then focus on the Principal-agent problem. We first characterize the Agent behavior for
a fixed regulation policy represented by a random variable ξ. Following the BSDEs approaches
to deal with exponential utility maximization, we get a unique optimal harvesting strategy as
a function of the Z component of the solution to a quadratic BSDE with terminal condition ξ
(see [24, 17]).
We next turn to the regulator problem which consists in maximizing an expected terminal
reward depending on the regulation tax ξ and the level of remaining natural resource according
to the Agent’s optimal response. By writing the explicit form of the resource manager’s optimal
strategy, we turn the regulator problem into a Markov stochastic control problem of a diffusion
with controlled drift. We then look for a regular solution to the related PDE to proceed by
verification. However, in our case we face the following three issues.
– By considering the logistic dynamics for the resource abundance population, the HJB
PDE related to the Principal problem involves a term of the form x2∂xv where x stands
for the resource population abundance and v is the Principals value function. This term,
induced by the inter-species competition in the classical logistic case, prevents us from
using existence results of regular solutions to PDEs.
– The shape of the optimal harvest of the manager leads to irregular coefficients for the
related PDE, which also prevents from getting regular solutions.
– Due to the exponential preferences of the Agent, the Principal’s admissible strategies
need to satisfy an exponential integrability condition. However, the linear preferences of
the Principal leads to an optimal contract that is not necessarily exponential integrable.
Therefore, the regulator problem might not have an optimal regulation policy.
To deal with these issues, we first study a model for which the inter-species competition coeffi-
cient µ of the population is bounded. Hence, the term x2∂xv is replaced by xµ(x)∂xv. We then
construct a regular approximation of the Hamiltonian. By considering the related PDE, we de-
rive a regular solution (see Proposition 4.1) together with an almost optimal control satisfying
the admissibility condition (see Theorem 4.2). We notice that our approach can be related to
that of Fleming and Soner [27], which consists in an approximating the value function by a
sequence of smooth value functions to derive a dynamic programming principle. We next turn
to the logistic case i.e. µ(x) = x for which we show that the almost optimal strategy obtained
for a truncation of µ remains an almost optimal strategy for a large value of the truncation
parameter (see Theorem 4.3).
We finally illustrate our results by numerical experiments. We compute the almost optimal
strategies using approximations of solutions to HJB PDEs and show that the regulation has a
significant effect on the level of remaining natural resource.
The remainder of the paper is the following. In Section 2 we describe the considered mathe-
matical problem. We then solve in Section 3 the manager’s problem for a given regulation policy.
In Section 4, we first provide almost optimal strategies in the case where the coefficient µ is
bounded and we extend our result to the logisitic dynamics. We end Section 4 by economical
insights and numerical experiments.
3
Notations and spaces
We give in this part all the notations used in this paper. Let (Ω,F ,P) be a complete probability
space. We assume that this space is equipped with a standard Brownian motion W and we
denote by F := (Ft)t≥0 its right-continuous and complete natural filtration.
Let p ≥ 1 and a time horizon T > 0, we introduce the following spaces
– P(R) (resp. Pr(R)) will denote the σ-algebra of R-progressively mesurable, F-adapted
(resp. F-predictable) integrable processes.
– SpT is the set of processes X, P(R)-mesurable and continuous satisfying
E[ sup
0≤t≤T
|Xt|p] < +∞ .
– HpT is the set of processes X, Pr(R)-mesurable satisfying
E
[( ∫ T
0
|Xt|2dt
) p
2
]
< +∞ .
– For an integer q ≥ 0, a subset D of Rq and for any ν ∈ (0, 1), we denote by C1+ν(D) the
set of continuously differentiable functions f : D → R such that
|f |1 = sup
x∈D
(
|f(x)|+
∑
1≤i≤q
|∂xif(x)|+ sup
x,y∈D
∑
1≤i≤q
|∂xif(x)− ∂xif(y)|
|x− y|ν
)
<∞ ,
and by C2+ν(D) the set of twice continuously differentiable functions f : D → R such
that
|f |2+ν = sup
x∈D
(
|f(x)|+
∑
1≤i≤q
|∂xif(x)|+
∑
1≤i,j≤q
|∂xi,xjf(x)|
)
+ sup
x,y∈D
∑
1≤i,j≤q
|∂xi,xjf(x)− ∂xi,xjf(y)|
|x− y|ν < ∞ .
2 The model
2.1 The natural resource
We fix a deterministic time horizon T > 0 and we suppose that the natural resource abundance
Xµt at time t ≥ 0 is given by
Xµt = X0 +
∫ t
0
Xµs (λ− µ(Xµs ))ds+
∫ t
0
σXµs dWs , t ∈ [0, T ] , (2.1)
where X0, λ and σ are positive constants. The quantities X0 and λ correspond to the initial
natural resource abundance and the growth rate respectively. The map µ represents the com-
petition inside the species considered or more generally an auto-degradation parameter for a
natural resource. We assume that the map µ satisfies the following assumption
(H0) µ is a map from R+ to R+ such that (2.1) admits a unique strong solution in S2T .
Note that Assumption (H0) holds for instance if the map x 7−→ xµ(x) is Lipschitz continuous.
Another important example is the so-called logistic equation where µ(x) = x on R+, see for
example in [12]. In this last case, SDE (2.1) admits an explicit unique solution that will be
denoted in the sequel by X and given by
Xt =
X0e
(λ−σ22 )t+σWt
1 +X0
∫ t
0
e(λ−
σ2
2 )s+σWsds
, t ∈ [0, T ] .
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The ecological interpretation of this model is the following. At time t, if the coefficient µ(Xµt ) is
larger than λ then the drift of the diffusion is negative. Therefore the abundance of the natural
resource Xµt decreases in mean. Conversely, if µ(X
µ
t ) is smaller than λ then the drift of the
diffusion is positive. Hence, the abundance Xµt increases in mean. For more details see for
instance [21, Proposition 3.4].
More general models can be used in practice and one of the main challenges, see [21], is to rely
branching processes with birth and death intensities to the solutions of continuous SDEs.
2.2 The Agent’s problem
We consider an agent who tries to make profit from the natural resource. We suppose that
this agent owns facilities to either harvest or renew this resource. We assume that his action
happends continuously in time and we denote by αt his intervention rate at time t, i.e. the abun-
dance Xµt will decrease of an amount αtX
µ
t per unit of time. This means that if the intervention
rate αt is positive (resp. negative), the Agent harvests (resp. renews) the natural resource. We
denote by A the set of F-adapted processes defined on [0, T ] and valued in [−M,M ] where M
and M are two nonnegative constants. If the Agent is prohibited to renew the resource then
M = 0. This set A is called the set of admissible actions.
To take into account the control α of the Agent on the natural resource abundance, we
introduce the probability measure Pα defined by its density Hα w.r.t. P given by
dPα
dP
∣∣∣
FT
:= HαT ,
where the process Hα is defined by
Hαt := exp
(
−
∫ t
0
αs
σ
dWs − 1
2
∫ s
0
∣∣∣αs
σ
∣∣∣2ds) , t ∈ [0, T ] .
In the sequel, we denote by Eα and Eαt the expectation and conditional expectation given Ft
respectively, for any t ∈ [0, T ], under the probability measure Pα.
For α ∈ A, we get from Girsanov Theorem (see e.g. Theorem 5.1 in [18]) that the process
Wα defined by
Wαt := Wt +
∫ t
0
αs
σ
ds , t ∈ [0, T ] ,
is a Brownian motion under the probability Pα. Thus, for a given admissible effort α ∈ A, the
dynamics of X can be rewritten under the probability Pα as
Xµt = x+
∫ t
0
(
Xµs (λ− µ(Xµs ))− αsXµs
)
ds+
∫ t
0
σXµs dW
α
s , t ∈ [0, T ] .
This new dynamics reflects the evolution of the population with a rate αt per unit of time.
Hence, αtX
µ
t has to be seen as the speed of the exploitation of the natural resource at time t.
We then are given a price function p : R+ → R+ and we suppose that the price per unit
of the natural resource on the market is given by p(Xµt ) at time t ≥ 0. We make the following
assumption on the price function p.
(Hp) There exists a constant P such that p(x)x ≤ P for all x ∈ [0,+∞).
This price function p allows to take into account the dependence w.r.t. the abundance (the
more abundant the resource is, the cheaper it will be and conversely). Such a price dependence
has already been used to model liquidity effects on financial market, where empirical studies
showed that the impact is of the form p(x) = Pe−β1x
β2
, x ∈ R+, for some positive constants P ,
β1 and β2 (see e.g. [1, 20]). In particular, (Hp) is satisfied for this type of dependence. Another
basic example for which (Hp) holds is the case p(x) = Px
−1, x > 0. This last example reflects
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the inability to buy the natural resource once it is extinct.
We assume that the manager sells the harvested resource on the market at price p(Xµt ) per
unit at time t if αt is positive, and pays the price p(X
µ
t ) per unit of natural resource at time t
if αt is negative to renew this one. This provides the global amount
∫ T
0
p(Xµt )X
µ
t αtdt over the
time horizon [0, T ].
We also suppose that giving an effort is costly for the manager and we consider the classical
quadratic cost function k : R→ R+ given by k(α) = |α|
2
2 , α ∈ R. Thus, the Agent is penalized
by the instantaneous amount k(αt) per unit of time for a given effort α ∈ A. This leads to the
global payment
∫ T
0
k(αt)dt over the considered time horizon [0, T ].
In our investigation, we recall that the activity of the natural resource manager is regulated
by an institution (usually an environment administration) who is taking care about the size
of the remaining natural resource. To avoid an over-exploitation, the regulator imposes a tax
on the Agent depending on the remaining resource. This tax amount is represented by an
FT -measurable random variable ξ and is paid at time T . Note that ξ can be either positive or
negative. In this last case, it means that the regulator gives a compensation to the manager.
Throughout the paper we assume that the Agent’s preferences are given by the exponential
utility function uA defined by
uA(x) := − exp
(− γx) , x ∈ R ,
where γ is a positive constant corresponding to the risk aversion of the Agent. We define the
value function VA(ξ) of the Agent associated to the taxation policy ξ by
VA(ξ) := sup
α∈A
Eα
[
− exp
(
− γ( ∫ T
0
p(Xµs )X
µ
s αsds−
∫ T
0
|αs|2
2
ds− ξ))] . (2.2)
For a fixed tax ξ, we denote by A∗(ξ) the set of efforts α∗ ∈ A satisfying the following equality
Eα
∗[− exp(− γ( ∫ T
0
p(Xµs )X
µ
s α
∗
sds−
∫ T
0
|α∗s |2
2
ds− ξ))] = VA(ξ) .
An effort α∗ ∈ A∗(ξ) is said to be optimal for the fixed tax ξ.
2.3 The Principal’s problem
The aim of the regulator is to stabilize the resource population at a fixed target size at the
maturity T . For that, a tax ξ is chosen to incentivize the Agent to manage the natural resource
so that the remaining population is close to the targeted size. Hence, the regulator benefits
from the tax paid by the Agent and is penalized through a cost function f depending on the
size of the resource at maturity T . The expected reward under the action α ∈ A of the Agent
is then given by
Eα
[
ξ − f(XµT )
]
.
Typically, we have in mind f(x) = c(β − x)+ meaning that the regulator targets a population
size β > 0 at time T for the sustainability of the resource and pays the cost c per unit if the
natural resource is over-consumed. This function f can be seen as the amount that the regulator
must pay to reintroduce the missing resource.
We suppose that the resource manager is rational. Therefore, the Principal anticipates that for
a tax ξ, the Agent will choose an effort α in the set A∗(ξ). Note that this set is not necessarily
reduced to a singleton2, hence, as usual in moral hazard problems (see for instance [16] for the
2 In our investigation, we will show that the set A∗(ξ) is reduced to a single element.
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formulation of the moral hazard problem), the regulator solves
sup
ξ
V P (ξ) , with V P (ξ) = sup
α∈A∗(ξ)
Eα
[
ξ − f(XµT )
]
, (2.3)
where ξ lives in a set of suitable contracts defined in the following section.
2.4 Class of contracts and utility reservation
We now introduce a reserve utility R which is a negative constant. This reserve means that
the regulator cannot penalize too strongly the Agent for economical reasons so that the utility
VA(ξ) expected by the Agent has to be greater than R. For instance, we can choose R such that
the regulator monitors the Agent by promising the same expected utility as the case without
regulation (see Section 4.3.1 for more details). This example reflects a non-punitive taxation
policy in which the regulator purely monitors the activities of the Agent. In our model, the sign
of the tax ξ is on purpose. This means that the natural resource manager pays the fee to the
regulator when ξ is positive and conversely, the regulator compensates the Agent’s activity when
ξ is negative. Moreover, we need to impose an exponential integrability on the tax ξto ensure
the well-posdness of VA(ξ). We therefore introduce the class CµR of admissible taxes defined as
the set of FT -measurable random variables ξ such that
VA(ξ) ≥ R , (2.4)
and there exists a constant γ′ > 2γ such that
E
[
exp(γ′|ξ|)] < +∞ . (2.5)
This last condition is very convenient since it allows to deal with the problem by using the theory
of BSDEs. Moreover, a straightforward application of Cauchy-Schwarz inequality ensures that
the optimization problems VA(ξ) and V
P (ξ) take finite values.
3 Optimal effort of the natural resource’s manager
We first solve the optimal problem of the Agent (2.2) under taxation policy ξ ∈ CµR. As in [9],
the following result shows that solving the Agent problem gives both an optimal effort α∗ and
a particular representation of the tax ξ with respect to the solution of a BSDE.
Theorem 3.1. Let ξ ∈ CµR and Assumption (Hp) be satisfied. There exists a unique pair
(Y0, Z) ∈ (−∞, R˜]×H2T with R˜ := log(−R)γ such that
(i) the tax has the following decomposition
ξ = Y0 −
∫ T
0
(
g(Xµt , Zt) +
σ2
2
γ|Zt|2
)
dt+
∫ T
0
σZtdWt , (3.6)
where g is defined for any (x, z) ∈ R+ × R by
g(x, z) =
|a∗(x, z)|2
2
− p(x)xa∗(x, z)− a∗(x, z)z ,
and
a∗(x, z) =
(
(p(x)x+ z) ∨ (−M)) ∧M , (3.7)
(ii) the value of the Agent is given by
VA(ξ) = − exp(γY0) ,
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(iii) the process α∗(ξ) defined by α∗t (ξ) = a
∗(Xµt , Zt) is the unique optimal effort associated
with the tax ξ given by (3.6).
Proof. The proof is divided in three steps and is related to the BSDE associated with the value
function of the Agent. We first introduce a dynamic extension of the optimization problem
(2.2). We denote by J(t, ξ) the dynamic value function of the Agent at time t for a tax ξ which
is defined by
J(t, ξ) := ess inf
α∈A
Eαt
[
exp
(
− γ( ∫ T
t
p(Xµs )X
µ
s αsds−
∫ T
t
k(αs)ds− ξ
))]
.
Note that VA(ξ) = −J(0, ξ).
Step 1. Dynamic utility of the Agent and BSDE. We characterize J(·, ξ) as the unique solution
of a BSDE and we derive the optimal control by using comparison results.
Let α ∈ A, we introduce the process Jα(ξ) defined by
Jαt (ξ) := EP
α
t
[
exp
(
− γ( ∫ T
t
p(Xµs )X
µ
s αsds−
∫ T
t
k(αs)ds− ξ
))]
,
so that
J(t, ξ) := ess inf
α∈At
Jαt (ξ) . (3.8)
Step 1a. Martingale representation and integrability.
We know that the processHαt (exp(γ
∫ t
0
(
k(αs)−p(Xµs )Xµs αs
)
ds)Jαt (ξ))0≤t≤T is a (P,F)-martingale.
In view of the condition (2.5), there exists ε > 0 and q > 1 such that (2 + ε)qγ ≤ γ′. Hence,
for p > 1 such that 1p +
1
q = 1, since α is bounded and Condition (2.5) is satisfied, we get from
Ho¨lder’s inequality
E[|HαTJαT (ξ)|2+ε] ≤ E[|H
α
T |(2+ε)p]
1
pE[|e(2+ε)qγξ|] 1q < +∞ ,
where H
α
t := H
α
t exp
(
γ
∫ t
0
(
k(αs)−p(Xµs )Xµs αs
)
ds
)
. Hence, by using Doob’s maximal inequal-
ity, H
α
Jα(ξ) ∈ S2+ε. So by using the martingale representation theorem, we know there exists
a process Z
α ∈ H2+εT such that
H
α
t J
α
t (ξ) = J
α
0 +
∫ t
0
σZ
α
s dWs , t ∈ [0, T ] .
Therefore, Jα satisfies
dJαt (ξ) = (αtZ˜
α
t − γ(k(αt)− p(Xµt )Xµt αt)Jαt (ξ))dt+ σZ˜αt dWt ,
where Z˜αt =
Z
α
t
H
α
t
+ Jαt
αt
σ2 for any t ∈ [0, T ], and JαT (ξ) = exp(γξ).
We now prove that Z˜α ∈ H2T . From (2.5), the boundedness of α and Assumption (Hp),
there exists a positive constant C > 0 such that
E
[ ∫ T
0
|Z
α
t
H
α
t
+ Jαt
αt
σ2
|2dt
]
≤ 2
(
E
[ ∫ T
0
|Z
α
t
H
α
t
|2dt
]
+ E
[ ∫ T
0
|Jαt
αt
σ2
|2dt
])
≤ C
(
1 + E
[ ∫ T
0
|Z
α
t
H
α
t
|2dt
])
.
We set q˜ := 1 + ε2 and p˜ > 1 such that
1
p˜ +
1
q˜ = 1. Using Ho¨lder and BDG Inequalities and since
Z
α ∈ H2+εT , we get
E[
∫ T
0
|Z
α
t
H
α
t
|2dt] ≤ E[ sup
t∈[0,T ]
|(Hαt )−1|2
∫ T
0
|Zαt |2dt]
≤ E[ sup
t∈[0,T ]
|(Hαt )−1|2p˜]
1
p˜E[
( ∫ T
0
|Zαt |2dt
)q˜
]
1
q˜
< +∞ .
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Consequently, we get Z˜α ∈ H2T .
Step 1b. Comparison of BSDEs and optimal effort. We now turn to the characterization of the
solution to (3.8) by a BSDE. We introduce the following BSDE
dJ t(ξ) = − inf
a∈[−M,M ]
G(Xµt , J t(ξ), Z˜t, a)dt+ σZ˜tdWt , JT (ξ) = exp(γξ) , (3.9)
where
G(x, j, z˜, a) := γ(k(a)− p(x)xa)j − az˜ .
This BSDE has a Lipschitz generator and square integrable terminal condition from (2.5).
Therefore it admits a unique solution in S2 × H2T . Moreover, for any α ∈ A, we notice that
(Jα(ξ), Z˜α) satisfies the following BSDE
dJαt (ξ) = −G(Xµt , Jαt (ξ), Z˜αt , αt)dt+ σZ˜αt dWt , JαT (ξ) = exp(γξ) .
By classical comparison Theorem, we have
J t(ξ) ≤ J(t, ξ) , ∀t ∈ [0, T ] .
Then, we notice that BSDE (3.9) can be rewritten
dJ t(ξ) = −G
(
Xµt , J t(ξ), Z˜t, a
∗(Xµt , Z˜tγJ t(ξ))
)
dt+ σZ˜tdWt , JT (ξ) = exp(γξ) .
In particular, we have J(ξ) = Ja
∗
(
Xµ, Z˜
γJ(ξ)
)
(ξ) by uniqueness of the solution to BSDE (3.9).
Therefore, we get
J t(ξ) = J(t, ξ) and a
∗(Xµ, Z˜
γJ(ξ)
) ∈ A∗(ξ) . (3.10)
We now prove that this optimal effort is unique. Let α˜ ∈ A be an other optimal effort, then
we have
J α˜0 = J
a∗
(
Xµ, Z˜
γJ(ξ)
)
0 .
From strict comparison Theorem (see for instance [10, Theorem 2.2]) we get J α˜ = Ja
∗
(
Xµ, Z˜
γJ(ξ)
)
and
G
(
Xµ, J(ξ), Z˜, a∗
(
Xµ,
Z˜
γJ(ξ)
))
= G
(
Xµ, J(ξ), Z˜, α˜
)
, dt⊗ dP− a.e.
By the uniqueness of the minimizer of G(Xµt , J t(ξ), Z˜t, ·), we deduce that α˜ = a∗
(
Xµ, Z˜γJ(ξ)
)
.
Step 2. Representation of ξ.
Since, by definition, the process Ja
∗
(
Xµ, Z˜
γJ(ξ)
)
is positive, we can define the processes Y and Z
by
Y :=
log
(
Ja
∗
(
Xµ, Z˜
γJ(ξ)
))
γ
and Z :=
Z˜
γJa
∗
(
Xµ, Z˜
γJ(ξ)
) . (3.11)
We obtain
dYt = −
(
k(a∗(Xµ, Zt))− p(Xµt )Xµt a∗(Xµ, Zt)− a∗(Xµ, Zt)Zt +
σ2
2
γ|Zt|2
)
dt+ σZtdWt ,
YT = ξ .
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We first prove Y ∈ S2. Note for any t ∈ [0, T ], by using Jensen inequality, we have
1
γ
log(J t(ξ)) ≥ Eα
∗
t
[ ∫ T
t
(
k(α∗s)− p(Xµs )Xµs α∗s
)
ds+ ξ
]
≥ Eα∗t [ξ]− TPM ,
where α∗ stands for a∗
(
Xµ, Z˜γJ(ξ)
)
and M = M ∨M . We then notice
– if J t(ξ) ≥ 1 we have
0 ≤ log(J t(ξ)) ≤ J t(ξ) ,
– if 0 ≤ J t(ξ) < 1 we have ∣∣∣ 1
γ
log(J t(ξ))
∣∣∣ ≤ TPM + Eα∗t [|ξ|] .
Hence, there exists a constant C > 0 such that∣∣∣ 1
γ
log(J t(ξ))
∣∣∣2 ≤ C(1 + Eα∗t [|ξ|]2) + 1γ2 |J t(ξ)|2 , t ∈ [0, T ] .
From Young inequality, we get
E
[
sup
t∈[0,T ]
∣∣∣ 1
γ
log(J t(ξ))
∣∣∣2] ≤ 2C(1 + E[ sup
t∈[0,T ]
(Hα∗T
Hα
∗
t
)4]
+ E[|ξ|4]
)
+
1
γ2
E
[
sup
t∈[0,T ]
|J t(ξ)|2
]
.
Since α∗ is bounded, we have E
[
supt∈[0,T ]
(
Hα
∗
T
Hα
∗
t
)4]
< +∞.
Using J(ξ) ∈ S2, we obtain
E[ sup
t∈[0,T ]
∣∣∣ 1
γ
log(J t(ξ))
∣∣∣2] < +∞ .
Which implies Y ∈ S2.
We now check Z ∈ H2T . To this end, we use a localization procedure by introducing the
sequence of stopping times (τn)n≥1 defined by
τn := inf
{
t ∈ [0, T ],
∫ t
0
|Zs|2ds ≥ n
}
∧ T ,
for any n ≥ 1. Similarly to the proof of [6, Theorem 2], we apply Itoˆ’s Formula to ι(|Y |) where
ι(x) = 1γ2 (e
γx − γx− 1) for x ∈ R. We obtain
ι(|Y0|) = ι(|Yτn |) +
∫ τn
0
(
ι′(|Ys|)sgn(Ys)
(
g(Xµs , Zs) +
σ2γ
2
|Zs|2
)− 1
2
ι′′(|Ys|)σ2|Zs|2
)
ds
−
∫ τn
0
σι′(|Ys|)sgn(Ys)ZsdWs .
Since ι′′ − γι′ = 1 and ι′(x) ≥ 0 for x ≥ 0, we get from BDG and Young inequalities
E
[ ∫ τn
0
|Zs|2ds
]
≤ C
(
1 + E
[
sup
t∈[0,T ]
eγ|Yt| +
∫ T
0
eγ|Yt|
(
1 + |Ys|
)])
. (3.12)
From the definition of Y and since α∗ is bounded, there exists a constant C such that
2γ|Yt| ≤ C + 2γEα∗t [|ξ|] .
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Using Jensen and Ho¨lder inequalities we get another constant C ′ such that
E
[
sup
t∈[0,T ]
e2γ|Yt|
]
≤ C ′E
[
sup
t∈[0,T ]
(Hα∗T
Hα
∗
t
) γ′
γ′−γ
] γ′−γ
γ′ E
[
e2γ
′|ξ|
] γ
γ′
.
Since α∗ is bounded, we have E
[
supt∈[0,T ]
(
Hα
∗
T
Hα
∗
t
) γ′
γ′−γ
]
< +∞ and we get from (2.5)
E
[
sup
t∈[0,T ]
e2γ|Yt|
]
< +∞ .
Sending n to ∞ in (3.12), we get from Fatou’s Lemma Z ∈ H2.
Step 3. Conclusion. We directly deduce (ii) and (iii) from (3.11) together with (3.10) given
that (i) has been proved in Step 2.

4 The problem of the regulator
In this section, we focus on the regulation policy. In view of (2.3) and Theorem 3.1 the regula-
tor’s problem turns to be
V PR = sup
ξ∈CµR
Eα
∗(ξ)[ξ − f(XµT )] . (4.13)
We first provide almost optimal contracts for a bounded parameter µ by a PDE approach. We
then extend the study to the logistic case with µ(x) = x.
4.1 Almost optimal strategies for bounded auto-degradation and cost
parameters
We introduce the following class of contracts
Ξµ :=
{
Y Y0,Z,µT = Y0 −
∫ T
0
(
h(Xµt , Zt) +
σ2
2
γ|Zt|2
)
dt+
∫ T
0
σZtdWt ,
Y0 ≤ R˜ , Z ∈ Z
}
, (4.14)
where Z denotes the subset of predictable processes of H2T such that
E[exp(γ′|Y Y0,Z,µT |)] < +∞ , (4.15)
for some γ′ > 2γ and we recall that R˜ = log(−R)γ . When µ is the identity, we omit the exponent
µ in the previous definitions.
From Theorem 3.1, constraint (2.4) and integrability conditions (2.5) and (4.15), the set CµR
coincides with Ξµ so that the regulator’s problem (4.13) becomes
V PR = sup
Y0≤R˜, Z∈Z
Ea
∗(Xµ,Z)[Y Y0,Z,µT − f(XµT )] , (4.16)
with
Y Y0,Z,µt = Y0 −
∫ t
0
(
k(α∗s)− p(Xµs )Xµs α∗s +
σ2
2
γ|Zs|2
)
dt+
∫ t
0
σZsdW
∗
s , t ∈ [0, T ] ,
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where W ∗ stands for W a
∗(Xµ,Z). We notice that the function to maximize in V PR is non-
deacreasing w.r.t. the variable Y0. Therefore the constraint Y0 ≤ R˜ is saturated and (4.16) can
be rewritten under the following form
V PR = sup
Z∈Z
Ea
∗(Xµ,Z)[Y R˜,Z,µT − f(XµT )] . (4.17)
To construct a solution to the problem (4.17), we introduce the related HJB PDE given by{
−∂tv −H
(
x, ∂xv(t, x), ∂xxv(t, x)
)
= 0 , (t, x) ∈ [0, T )× R∗+ ,
v(T, x) = −f(x) , x ∈ R∗+ ,
(4.18)
where the Hamiltonian H is given by
H(x, δ1, δ2) = sup
z∈R
{
xp(x)a∗(x, z)− k(a∗(x, z))− σ
2
2
γz2 + x(λ− µ(x)− a∗(x, z))δ1
}
+
σ2
2
x2δ2 , (x, δ1, δ2) ∈ R∗+ × R× R ,
and a∗ is given by (3.7). We first extend PDE (4.18) to the whole domain [0, T ]×R by considering
the change of variable w(t, y) := v(t, ey) for any (t, y) ∈ [0, T ]× R. We get the following PDE{
−∂tw −H
(
y, ∂yw(t, y), ∂yyw(t, y)
)
= 0 , (t, y) ∈ [0, T )× R ,
w(T, y) = −f(ey) , y ∈ R ,
(4.19)
where
H(y, δ1, δ2) := sup
z∈R
{
eyp(ey)a∗(ey, z)− a
∗(ey, z)2
2
− σ
2
2
γz2 + (λ− σ
2
2
− µ(ey)− a∗(ey, z))δ1
}
+
σ2
2
δ2 , (y, δ1, δ2) ∈ R× R× R .
Our aim is to construct a regular solution to this PDE to proceed by verification. Unfortunately,
the coefficients of PDE (4.19) are not smooth enough to do so. To overcome this issue, we provide
a smooth approximation Hε of H for which we get regular solutions.
Moreover, we introduce the following assumption, which ensure that the optimal control
derived from the PDE satisfies the admissibility condition, i.e. belongs to Z.
(H’) There exists ν ∈ (0, 1) such that
(i) the map y 7→ µ(ey) belongs to C1+ν(R),
(ii) the map y 7→ f(ey) belongs to C2+ν(R),
(iii) the map y 7→ p(ey)ey belongs to C1+ν(R).
Proposition 4.1. Under (H’), there exists a family {Hε, ε > 0} of functions from R3 to R
such that the PDE{
−∂twε −Hε
(
y, ∂ywε(t, y), ∂yywε(t, y)
)
= 0 , (t, y) ∈ [0, T )× R ,
wε(T, y) = −f(ey) , y ∈ R ,
(4.20)
admits a unique solution wε in C
2+ν([0, T ]× R) and
sup
R3
∣∣H−Hε∣∣ ≤ ε (4.21)
for any ε > 0 .
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The proof of Proposition 4.1 consists in an approximation by regularization of the original
Hamiltonian H. As it is quite technical we postpone this proof to the appendix.
We are now able to describe almost optimal contracts and related almost optimal efforts using
the functions wε given by Proposition 4.1.
Theorem 4.2. Suppose that (H’) holds. For any ε > 0, the tax policy ξε given by
ξε = R˜−
∫ T
0
(
g(Xµt , Z
ε
t ) +
1
2
σ2γ|Zεt |2 + Zεt (λ− µ(Xµt ))
)
dt+
∫ T
0
Zεt
Xµt
dXµt ,
where
Zεt = −
∂xwε(t, log(X
µ
t ))
1 + γσ2
, t ∈ [0, T ] , (4.22)
is 2Tε-optimal for the regulator problem:
V PR ≤ Ea
∗(Xµ,Zε)[ξε − f(XµT )]+ 2Tε .
Proof. We fix some control Z ∈ Z and we apply Itoˆ’s formula to the process (Y R˜,Z,µt +
wε(t, log(X
µ
t ))
)
t∈[0,T ]
Y R˜,Z,µT + wε(T, log(X
µ
T )) = R˜+ wε(0, log(X0))
+
∫ T
0
(
∂twε(s, log(X
µ
s ))
+(λ− σ
2
2
− µ(Xµs )− a∗(Xµs , Zs))∂xwε(s, log(Xµs ))
+p(Xµs )a
∗(Xµs , Zs)X
µ
s − k(a∗(Xµs , Zs))−
σ2
2
γ|Zs|2
+
σ2
2
∂xxwε(s, log(X
µ
s ))
)
ds
+σ
∫ T
0
(∂xwε(s, log(X
µ
s )) + Zs) dW
∗
s ,
where W ∗ stands for W a
∗(Xµ,Z). Since wε ∈ C2+ν([0, T ]× R) and Z ∈ Z we get
Ea
∗(Xµ,Z)
[
Y R˜,Z,µT + wε(T, log(X
µ
T ))
]
≤ R˜+ wε(0, log(X0))
+
∫ T
0
Ea
∗(Xµ,Z)
[(
∂twε +H
(
., ∂ywε, ∂yywε
))
(s, log(Xµs ))
]
ds .
From (4.21) we get
Ea
∗(Xµ,Z)
[
Y R˜,Z,µT + wε(T, log(X
µ
T ))
]
≤ R˜+ wε(0, log(X0)) + Tε
+
∫ T
0
Ea
∗(Xµ,Z)
[(
∂twε +Hε
(
., ∂ywε, ∂yywε
))
(s, log(Xµs ))
]
ds ,
and since wε is solution to (4.20), we get
Ea
∗(Xµ,Z)
[
Y R˜,Z,µT − f(XµT )
]
≤ R˜+ wε(0, log(X0)) + Tε .
Since Z is arbitrarily chosen in Z we get
V PR ≤ R˜+ wε(0, log(X0)) + Tε . (4.23)
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We now take Z = Zε where Zε is given by (4.22). We now notice that Zε ∈ Z since Zε is
bounded, and by definition of Zε we have
H
(
log(Xµ), ∂ywε(., log(X
µ)), ∂yywε(., log(X
µ))
)
= Xµp(Xµ)a∗(Xµ, Zε)− a
∗(Xµ, Zε)2
2
− σ
2
2
γ
∣∣Zε∣∣2 + σ2
2
∂yywε(., log(X
µ))
+
(
λ− σ
2
2
− µ(Xµ)− a∗(Xµ, Zε))∂ywε(., log(Xµ))
for any [0, T ]. A straightforward application of Itoˆ’s formula and Girsanov Theorem give
Ea
∗(Xµ,Zε)[Y R˜,Z
ε,µ
T − f(XµT )] = R˜+ wε(0, log(X0))
+
∫ T
0
Ea
∗(Xµ,Zε)
[(
∂twε +H
(
., ∂ywε, ∂yywε
))
(s, log(Xµs ))
]
ds .
From Propositions (4.20) and (4.21) we get
Ea
∗(Xµ,Zε)[Y R˜,Z
ε,µ
T − f(XµT )] ≥ R˜+ wε(0, log(X0))− Tε .
Hence, we get from (4.23)
V PR ≤ Ea
∗(Xµ,Zε)[Y R˜,Z
ε,µ
T − f(XµT )] + 2Tε .
Therefore, we get ξε = Y
R˜,Zε,µ
T is a 2Tε-optimal policy for the regulator.
4.2 Extension to the logistic equation and continuous cost
We consider in this section an approximation method to build a sequence of almost optimal
taxes in the case the classical logistic dynamic for SDE (2.1), i.e. µ(x) = x. More precisely,
we introduce a sequence of approximated models from which we derive almost optimal strategy
from the previous section. We show that this sequence remains almost optimal for the logistic
model. We also weaken the assumption (H’) (ii) as follows.
(Hf ’) The function f is bounded and continuous on R.
We introduce the sequence of mollifiers ρn : R→ R, n ≥ 1, defined by
ρn(x) :=
nρ(nx)∫
R ρ(u)du
, x ∈ R ,
where the function ρ : R→ R is defined by
ρ(x) := exp
( −1
1− |x|2
)
1|x]<1 .
We then define the functions fn, n ≥ 1, by
fn(x) :=
∫
R
f(y)ρn(x− y)dy , x ∈ R .
From classical results, we know that fn satisfies (H’)(ii) for all n ≥ 1 and fn converges to f as
n goes to infinity uniformly on every compact subset of R.
We also define the functions µn : R→ R, n ≥ 1, by
µn(x) := x
(
Θ(x+ en + 1)−Θ(x− (en + 1))) , x ∈ R , (4.24)
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where the function Θ : R→ R is given by
Θ(u) :=
∫ u
−∞ ρ(r)dr∫
R ρ(r)dr
, u ∈ R . (4.25)
We then notice that µn satisisfes (H’) (i) and
µn(x) = x , x ∈ [−en, en] ,
for n ≥ 1. We first have the following preliminary result on the convergence of Xµn to X.
Lemma 4.1. There exists a constant C such that
sup
t∈[0,T ]
E
[∣∣Xµnt −Xt∣∣2] ≤ C exp(− n24σ2) ,
for all n ≥ 1.
Proof. We define the sequence of stopping times (τn)n≥1 by
τn := inf{t ∈ [0, T ], Xt ≥ en} , n ≥ 1 . (4.26)
We then notice that
Xt∧τn = x+
∫ t∧τn
0
Xs(λ−Xs)ds+
∫ t∧τn
0
σXsdWs
= x+
∫ t
0
1s≤τnXs(λ− µn(Xs))ds+
∫ t
0
σ1s≤τnXsdWs ,
for all t ∈ [0, T ]. Therefore (Xt∧τn)t∈[0,T ] and (Xµnt∧τn)t∈[0,T ] satisfy the same SDE with random
and Lipschitz coefficients. By strong uniqueness, we have
Xt∧τn = X
µn
t∧τn , t ∈ [0, T ] .
Which implies
sup
t∈[0,T ]
E
[∣∣Xµnt −Xt∣∣2] = sup
t∈[0,T ]
E
[∣∣Xµnt −Xt∣∣21τn≤t] .
Hence, by using Cauchy-Schwarz Inequality, we have
sup
t∈[0,T ]
E
[∣∣Xµnt −Xt∣∣2] ≤ sup
t∈[0,T ]
E
[∣∣Xµnt −Xt∣∣4] 12P(τn ≤ T ) 12 , (4.27)
for all n ≥ 1.
We then notice that
Xµ0 ≥ Xµn ≥ X > 0 (4.28)
for all n ≥ 1. Indeed, by setting δn := Xµn −X , we have
δnt =
∫ t
0
bsδ
n
s ds+
∫ t
0
σδns dWs +
∫ t
0
csds
where
b :=
{
Xµn (λ−µn(Xµn ))−X(λ−µn(X))
δn
if Xµn −X 6= 0 ,
0 if Xµn −X = 0 ,
is a bounded process since x 7→ x(λ− µn(x)) is Lipschitz continuous, and
c = X(λ− µn(X))−X(λ−X)
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is a nonnegative process since µn(x) ≤ x for x ∈ [0,+∞). A straightforward computation shows
that
δnt = Rt
∫ t
0
cs
Rs
ds , t ∈ [0, T ] ,
where Rt = exp(
∫ t
0
(bs − σ2/2)ds+ σWt) for t ∈ [0, T ]. Since c ≥ 0 we get Xµn ≥ X. The same
argument applied to δ˜n = Xµn −Xµn+1 gives Xµn ≥ Xµn+1 .
From (4.27) and (4.28), there exists a constant C such that
sup
t∈[0,T ]
E
[∣∣Xµnt −Xt∣∣2] ≤ CP(τn ≤ T ) 12 , n ≥ 1 . (4.29)
Still using Xµ0 ≥ X > 0 and since Xµ0 is a geometric drifted brownian motion, we have
P
(
τn ≤ T
) ≤ P( sup
t∈[0,T ]
Wt ≥ n− (λ− σ
2/2)T
σ
)
.
Since supt∈[0,T ]Wt has the same law as |WT |, we get
P(τn ≤ T
) ≤ 2 ∫ +∞
n−(λ−σ2/2)T
σ
e
−y2
2
dy√
2pi
≤ C exp (− n2
2σ2
)
, n ≥ 1 , (4.30)
and we get the result from (4.29).
We then define the function V PR,n as the optimal value of the regulator problem in the model
with coefficients µn and fn in place of µ and f respectively
V PR,n = sup
ξ∈CµnR
Ea
∗(Xµn ,Z)[ξ − fn(XµnT )] .
Since µn and fn satisfy Assumptions (H’) (i) and (H’) (ii) respectively for all n ≥ 1, we get,
from Theorem 4.2, a sequence of bounded processes (Zε,n)n≥1 such that
V PR,n ≤ Ea
∗(Xµn ,Zε,n)[Y R˜,Z
ε,n,µn
T − fn(XµnT )] + 2Tε , n ≥ 1 .
We introduce the control Z˜ε,n defined by
Z˜ε,nt := Z
ε,n
t 1[0,τn](t) , t ∈ [0, T ] ,
where the stopping time τn is defined in (4.26), and we denote by ξ˜ε,n the related contract
ξ˜ε,n = Y
R,Z˜ε,n
T .
We then have the following almost optimality result.
Theorem 4.3. Suppose that (Hf ’) and (H’) (iii) hold. Then V
P
R < +∞ and we have
lim sup
n→+∞
(
V PR − EP
a∗(X,Z˜ε,n)[
ξ˜ε,n − f(XT )
]) ≤ 2Tε
for any ε > 0.
Proof. We proceed in four steps.
Step 1. The optimal value V PR is finite.
From (4.17) and the dynamics of Y R˜,Z we have
V PR ≤ sup
Z∈Z
Ea
∗(X,Z)[R˜+ TMP − f(XT )] < +∞ .
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Since f is bounded, we get V PR < +∞.
Step 2. Comparison of Ξµ and Ξµ
′
.
We fix two functions µ, µ′ satisfying (H0) and we show that Ξµ = Ξµ
′
where Ξµ and Ξµ
′
are
defined by (4.14). Let ξ = Y Y0,Z,µT ∈ Ξµ. Then, we have by definition
E[exp(γ′|Y Y0,Z,µT |)] < +∞ ,
for some γ′ > 2γ, with
Y Y0,Z,µT = Y0−
∫ T
0
( |a∗(Xµs , Zs)|2
2
−a∗(Xµs , Zs)(p(Xµs )Xµs +Zs) +
σ2
2
γ|Zs|2
)
ds+
∫ T
0
σZsdWs .
Since the optimal effort a∗ is bounded and Assumption (H’) (iii) holds, there exists a positive
constant C such that
E
[
exp(γ′|Y Y0,Z,µ′T |)
]
= E
[
eγ
′
∣∣Y0−∫ T0 ( |a∗(Xµ′s ,Zs)|22 −a∗(Xµ′s ,Zs)(p(Xµ′s )Xµ′s +Zs)+σ22 γ|Zs|2)ds+∫ T0 σZsdWs∣∣]
≤ CE
[
eγ
′
(∣∣Y0−∫ T0 ( |a∗(Xµs ,Zs)|22 −a∗(Xµ′s ,Zs)Zs+σ22 γ|Zs|2)ds+∫ T0 σZsdWs∣∣)]
≤ CE[eγ′|Y Y0,Z,µT |eδ∗T ] ,
where δ∗T = γ
′ ∫ T
0
|a∗(Xµ′s , Zs)− a∗(Xµs , Zs)||Zs|ds . We then notice that
|a∗(X ′, z)− a∗(X,Z)||z| = ∣∣(M ∧ (p(x′)x′ + z) ∨ (−M))− (M ∧ (p(x)x+ z) ∨ (−M))∣∣|z|
≤ (M +M)(P +M +M)
for any z ∈ R. Hence, we get
E[exp(γ′|Y Y0,Z,µ′T |)] ≤ Ceγ
′T (M+M)(P+M+M)E
[
eγ
′|Y Y0,Z,µT |
]
.
Hence, we get ξ ∈ Ξµ. We then write Ξ for Ξµ in the sequel.
Step 3. Convergence of the values for a given Z.
We fix Z ∈ Ξ. We then have
∆n(Z) :=
∣∣Ea∗(Xµn ,Z)[Y R˜,Z,µnT − fn(XµnT )]− Ea∗(X,Z)[Y R˜,ZT − f(XT )]∣∣
≤ ∆n1 (Z) + ∆n2 (Z) ,
with
∆n1 (Z) = E
[
|Ha∗(Xµn ,Z)T −Ha
∗(X,Z)
T ||Y R˜,ZT − f(XT )|
]
and
∆n2 (Z) = E
[
H
a∗(Xµn ,Z)
T |(Y R˜,ZT − f(XT ))− (Y R˜,Z,µnT − fn(XµnT ))|
]
.
We now study the convergence of ∆1n and ∆
2
n.
Substep 3.1. Convergence of ∆n1 .
By Cauchy-Schwarz inequality we have
∆n1 (Z) ≤ E[|Ha
∗(Xµn ,Z)
T −Ha
∗(X,Z)
T |2]
1
2E[|Y R˜,ZT − f(XT )|2]
1
2 .
From (4.15) and (Hf ’), E[|Y R˜,ZT − f(XT )|2]
1
2 is uniformly bounded w.r.t. n. The convergence
of ∆n1 (Z) remains to the convergence of
∆˜n1 (Z) = E[|Ha
∗(Xµn ,Z)
T −Ha
∗(X,Z)
T |2] .
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From the definition of a∗, for all q ≥ 1, there exists a constant Cq such that
E[|a∗(X,Z)− a∗(Xµn , Z)|q] ≤ CqE[|a∗(X,Z)− a∗(Xµn , Z)|2] , n ≥ 1 .
Therefore we have
sup
t∈[0,T ]
E[|a∗(Xt, Zt)− a∗(Xµnt , Zt)|q] −−−−−→
n→+∞ 0
for all q ≥ 1. From Lemma 4.1 and Theorem 2.8.1 in [19] we get ∆˜n1 (Z) −−−−−→
n→+∞ 0.
Substep 3.2. Convergence of ∆n2 .
From Cauchy-Schwarz Inequality, there exists a positive constant C > 0 such that
∆n2 (Z) ≤ E[|Ha
∗(Xµn ,Z)
T |2]
1
2E[|(Y R˜,ZT − f(XT ))− (Y R˜,Z,µnT − fn(XµnT ))|2]
1
2
≤ C E[|Ha∗(Xµn ,Z)T |2]
1
2
(
E
[∣∣Y R˜,Z,µnT − Y R˜,ZT ∣∣2] 12 + E[∣∣f(XT )− fn(XµnT )∣∣2] 12) .
First note that
E[|Ha∗(Xµn ,Z)T |2] = E[e−2
∫ T
0
a∗(Xµns ,Zs)σ
−1dWs−
∫ T
0
|a∗(Xµns ,Zs)|2σ−2ds]
= EQ[e
∫ T
0
|a∗(Xµns ,Zs)|2σ−2ds] ,
with dQ/dP = H2a
∗(Xµn ,Z)
T . Since |a∗(Xµn , Z)| is bounded by M ∨M , we deduce that
E[|Ha∗(Xµn ,Z)T |2] ≤ e
T (M∨M)2
σ2 .
We then have
E
[∣∣f(XT )− fn(XµnT )∣∣2] 12 ≤ C E[∣∣f(XT )− fn(XT )∣∣2] 12 + C E[∣∣fn(XT )− fn(XµnT )∣∣2] 12 .
Since f is continuous and bounded, we get from the dominated convergence Theorem
E
[∣∣f(XT )− fn(XT )∣∣2] −−−−−→
n→+∞ 0 .
Then from the definition of fn there exists a constant L such that fn is L-Lipchitz continuous
for all n ≥ 1. Therefore, we get from Lemma 4.1
E
[∣∣fn(XT )− fn(XµnT )∣∣2] −−−−−→n→+∞ 0 .
Since a∗ is continuous and bounded, and Z ∈ Z, we get from Lemma 4.1 and the definition of
Y R˜,Z,µn and Y R˜,Z
E
[∣∣Y R˜,Z,µnT − Y R˜,ZT ∣∣2] −−−−−→n→+∞ 0 .
Hence we get limn→+∞∆n2 (Z) = 0.
Step 4. Almost optimality of Z˜ε,n.
We fix η > 0 and Zη ∈ Ξ such that
V PR ≤ Ea
∗(X,Zη)[Y R˜,Z
η
T − f(XT )] + η .
By definition of Zε,n, we get
V PR − EP
a∗(Xµn,Zε,n)
[ξε,n − fn(Xµ
n
T )] ≤ η + 4Tε+ ∆n(Zη) , n ≥ 1 .
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Sending n to ∞, we get from Step 2
lim sup
n→+∞
V PR − EP
a∗(Xµn,Zε,n)
[ξε,n − fn(XµnT )] ≤ 4Tε+ η
for any η > 0. Which implies
lim sup
n→+∞
V PR − EP
a∗(Xµn,Zε,n)
[ξε,n − fn(XµnT )] ≤ 4Tε . (4.31)
Since f and a∗ are bounded, there exists a constant C such that
|EPa
∗(Xµn,Zε,n)
[fn(X
µn
T )]− EP
a∗(X,Z˜ε,n)
[f(XT )]|
≤ C
(
E[|Ha∗(Xµn ,Zε,n)T −Ha
∗(X,Zε,n)
T |2]
1
2 + P(τn ≤ T ) + E
[∣∣f(XT )− fn(XµnT )∣∣2] 12) .
We therefore get from Step 3 and (4.30)
EP
a∗(Xµn,Zε,n)
[fn(X
µn
T )]− EP
a∗(X,Z˜ε,n)
[f(XT )] −−−−−→
n→+∞ 0 . (4.32)
From (H’) (i) and the definition of a∗ we have
EP
a∗(Xµn,Zε,n)
[Y R,Z
ε,n
T ]− EP
a∗(X,Z˜ε,n)
[ξ˜ε,n]
≤ E
[
H
a∗(X,Z˜ε,n)
T
∫ T
0
(a∗(Xs, Z˜ε,ns )2
2
+ a∗(Xs, Z˜
ε,n
s )p(Xs)Xs
)
ds
]
− E
[
H
a∗(Xµn ,Zε,n)
T
∫ T
0
(a∗(Xµns , Zε,ns )2
2
+ a∗(Xµns , Z
ε,n
s )p(X
µn
s )X
µn
s
)
ds
]
+
γσ2
2
E
[
H
a∗(X,Z˜ε,n)
T
∫ T
0
|Z˜ε,ns |2ds−Ha
∗(Xµn ,Zε,n)
T
∫ τn
0
|Zε,ns |2ds
]
. (4.33)
By definition of τn we have
E
[
H
a∗(X,Z˜ε,n)
T
∫ T
0
|Z˜ε,ns |2ds−Ha
∗(Xµn ,Zε,n)
T
∫ τn
0
|Zε,ns |2ds
]
= 0 , (4.34)
and
E
[
H
a∗(X,Z˜ε,n)
T
∫ T∧τn
0
(a∗(Xs, Z˜ε,ns )2
2
+ a∗(Xs, Z˜
ε,n
s )p(Xs)Xs
)
ds
]
(4.35)
−E
[
H
a∗(Xµn ,Zε,n)
T
∫ T∧τn
0
(a∗(Xµns , Zε,ns )2
2
+ a∗(Xµns , Z
ε,n
s )p(X
µn
s )X
µn
s
)
ds
]
= 0 .
Since a∗ and x 7→ p(x)x are bounded, we get from (4.30)
E
[
H
a∗(X,Z˜ε,n)
T
∫ T
T∧τn
(a∗(Xs, Z˜ε,ns )2
2
+ a∗(Xs, Z˜
ε,n
s )p(Xs)Xs
)
ds
]
(4.36)
−E
[
H
a∗(Xµn ,Zε,n)
T
∫ T
T∧τn
(a∗(Xµns , Zε,ns )2
2
+ a∗(Xµns , Z
ε,n
s )p(X
µn
s )X
µn
s
)
ds
]
−−−−−→
n→+∞ 0 .
Therefore we get from (4.32), (4.33), (4.34), (4.35) and (4.36)
lim sup
n→+∞
EP
a∗(Xµn,Zε,n)
[Y R,Z
ε,n
T − fn(XµnT )]− EP
a∗(X,Z˜ε,n)
[ξ˜ε,n − f(XT )] ≤ 0 .
This last inequality with (4.31) give the result.
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4.3 Applications and economical interpretations
4.3.1 Non-regulated case and reservation utility
In this part, we provide a way to monitor the activities of the natural resource manager without
penalizing him by choosing a relevant reservation utility R. The natural way is to consider the
problem of the regulator without regulation policy
V A := sup
α∈A
Eα
[
− exp
(
− γ( ∫ T
0
p(Xµs )αsX
µ
s ds−
∫ T
0
|αs|2
2
ds
))]
.
This problem can be solved explicitly by direct computations. If the regulator chooses R = V A
then any admissible tax ξ will satisfy VA(ξ) ≥ V A. In other words, the choice of R ensures a
non-punitive regulation policy.
4.3.2 Numerical examples
We now give some numerical results to illustrate our theoretical results. For that we consider
µn given by (4.24), p(x) = px
−1 with p > 0 and f(x) = (c− cβx)1x<β where c is the cost of the
resource for the regulator and β is the target size of the population.
We use the following parameters: γ = 0.1, λ = 1.2, σ = 0.1, P = 1, T = 1, β = 0.9, c = 3,
M = M = 10, n = 100, ε = 0.01 with X0 = 1.2. We use an approximation grid of 2000 points
for the space and 5000 points for the time. In our case R = V A = − exp(−γP 2T ).
Figure 1: The optimal harvest rate w.r.t.
the time t and the population abundance
Xt.
Figure 2: The value function wε w.r.t. the
time and the population abundance.
Figure 1 shows the Agent harvests moderately at the beginning and the rate is increasing
w.r.t. the abundance population. On the contrary, for times close to the maturity the strategy
depends on the abundance of the resource. Indeed, for an abundance below the target β, i.e.
Xαt < 0.9, the Agent renews the population, and for an abundance higher than β, i.e. X
α
t ≥ 0.9,
the Agent harvests. Moreover, the lowest is the abundance, the most the Agent renews the pop-
ulation, and the highest is the abundance, the most the Agent harvests the population.
Figure 2 presents the graph of the value function wε of the Principal. The function wε is
increasing w.r.t. the population abundance. This property is expected in view of the Principal
optimization problem. We also remark that the value function wε is decreasing w.r.t. the time
to maturity. Indeed, the longer is the time to maturity, the best it is for the Agent and the
Principal since the resource has more time to regenerates itself.
Figure 3 shows that the Agent harvests with an important rate at the beginning : αt is
around 0.6. As he get closer to the matirity, the Agent slows down the harvest and then renew
the resource. This can be interpreted as follows.
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Figure 3: A trajectory of the optimally con-
trolled population abundance (green curve,
y-axis on the left) and the associated opti-
mal harvest rate (blue curve, y-axis on the
right) w.r.t. the time (x-axis). The dotted
line corresponds to α = 0, and the dashed
line corresponds to Xα
∗
t = β.
Figure 4: The evolution of the penalty (y-
axis on the right, red curve) and the popu-
lation abundance (y-axis on the left, green
curve) w.r.t. the time (x-axis).
The Agent harvests with a high rate and do note care about the tax at maturity since the
population as has time to regenerate itself.
Getting closer to the maturity, the Agent take into acount the tax and slows down the har-
vest. When very close to maturity, t ≈ 0.93, the Agent renews the population to ensure an
abundance close to the target β = 0.9 to limit the tax. This shows that the incentive policy is
efficient.
Figure 4 presents the forecast of the penalty (i.e. Y R˜,Z
ε,n) in red, and the abundance
population in green. We notice these two quantities evolve in opposite ways: for high values of
the abundance, the expected tax is low, and for low abundance the penalty becomes greater.
We now study the sensitivity of the incentive policy w.r.t. the target β (see Figure 5) and w.r.t.
the renewal cost c (see Figure 6).
Figure 5: Evolution in mean of the
population abundance w.r.t. the time
for different values of β.
Figure 6: Evolution in mean of the
population abundance w.r.t. the time
for different values of c.
Figure 5 presents the evolution in mean of the abundance w.r.t. time for several values of
β. The mean is approximated by the empirical mean over 1000 trajectories. We remark that at
each time the mean of the population abundance is more important as β is larger. This shows
that the choice of β influences the behavior of the resource manager: the most is important β
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the least the Agent harvests. We also notice that for each value of β, the mean terminal value
reaches the target, which also shows the incentive effect of the parameter β.
Figure 6 shows the evolution of the mean of the resource abundance w.r.t. time for several
values of the costs parameter c. The mean is approximated by the empirical mean over for 1000
trajectories. We remark that the population abundance is nondecreasing w.r.t. c. In particular,
the highest the penalty is, the most the Agent is concerned, through the incentive policy, by
the size of the population at the end.
We now compare the situation for which the Agent can renew the population abundance (that
is M > 0) with the situation for which the Agent can only harvest (that is M = 0). In Figure
Figure 7: Evolution in mean of the population abundance w.r.t. the time when the Agent can
(blue curve) and cannot (orange curve) renew the population abundance.
7 the mean is approximated by the empirical mean over 1000 trajectories. We remark that
at each time the population abundance is more important in mean if the Agent cannot renew
the resource. Indeed, if the resource is not renewable, the Agent reduces his harvesting rate
in prevision of the terminal tax. On the contrary, if the resource can be renewed, the Agent
harvests more to generate a higher profit since he can reduce the terminal tax by renewing the
resource at the end.
A Proof of Proposition 4.1
We first recall that H is defined by
H(y, δ1, δ2) = sup
z∈R
{
eyp(ey)a∗(ey, z)− a
∗(ey, z)2
2
− σ
2
2
γz2 + (λ− σ
2
2
− µ(ey)− a∗(ey, z))δ1
}
+
σ2
2
δ2 , (y, δ1, δ2) ∈ R× R× R .
From the definition of a∗ given in (3.7) we can rewrite H by considering the different cases
eyp(ey) + z < −M , −M ≤ eyp(ey) + z ≤ M and eyp(ey) + z > M , and making the variable
change z − eyp(ey) for z under the following form
H(y, δ1, δ2) = max
{
K1(y, δ1),K2(y, δ1),K3(y, δ1)
}
+ (λ− σ
2
2
− µ(ey))δ1 + σ
2
2
δ2 ,
where
K1(y, δ1) = sup
z≤−M
{(
δ1 − eyp(ey)− M
2
)
M − σ
2
2
γ (z − eyp(ey))2
}
=
(
δ1 − eyp(ey)− M
2
)
M − σ
2
2
γ (M + eyp(ey))
2
,
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K2(y, δ1) = sup
z≥M
{(
δ1 − eyp(ey)− M
2
)
M − σ
2
2
γ (z − eyp(ey))2
}
=
(
−δ1 + eyp(ey)− M
2
)
M − σ
2
2
γ
([
M − eyp(ey)]
+
)2
,
and
K3(y, δ1) = sup
−M≤z≤M
{
−1
2
(1 + γσ2)z2 +
(
eyp(ey)(1 + γ2σ)− δ1
)
z
}
− σ
2
2
γ|eyp(ey)|2
for all y, δ1 ∈ R.
A straightforward computation gives K3(y, δ1) = Q(eyp(ey), δ1) where
Q(p, δ1) =
(
p(1 + γ2σ)− δ1
)2
2(1 + γσ2)
1
p− δ1
1+γσ2
∈[−M,M ]
+
(
−1
2
(1 + γσ2)M
2
+
(
p(1 + γ2σ)− δ1
)
M
)
1
p− δ1
1+γσ2
∈(M,+∞)
+
(
−1
2
(1 + γσ2)M2 − (p(1 + γ2σ)− δ1)M)1p− δ1
1+γσ2
∈(−∞,−M)
−σ
2
2
γ|p|2
for all p, δ1 ∈ R.
We then introduce the functions absε : R→ R+ and maxε : R2 → R defined by
absε(x) = |x|
(
Θ
(
− 4
ε
x− 3
)
+ Θ
(4
ε
x− 3
))
, x ∈ R ,
maxε(x, y) =
absε(x− y) + x+ y
2
, x, y ∈ R ,
for any ε > 0 where we recall that the function Θ is defined by (4.25). From the definition of
Θ, the function maxε is infinitely differentiable with bounded derivatives and we have
sup
x, y ∈R
∣∣max(x, y)−maxε(x, y)∣∣ ≤ ε
3
(A.37)
for all ε > 0.
Fix the constant Γ := max
{
M(1 + γσ2), (P +M)(1 + γσ2)
}
. Since the function Q is con-
tinuous on R2, there exists Qε infinitely differentiable on R2 such that
sup
(p,δ1)∈[0,P ]×[−(Γ+1), Γ+1]
|Q(p, δ1)−Qε(p, δ1)| ≤ ε
3
. (A.38)
We then define K3,ε for any y, δ1 ∈ R by
K3,ε(y, δ1) = Qε(eyp(ey), δ1)
(
1−Θ(2(δ1 − Γ)− 1)−Θ
(− 2(Γ + δ1)− 1)))
+
(
−1
2
(1 + γσ2)M2 − (eyp(ey)(1 + γ2σ)− δ1)M)Θ(2(δ1 − Γ)− 1)
+
(
−1
2
(1 + γσ2)M
2
+
(
eyp(ey)(1 + γ2σ)− δ1
)
M
)
Θ
(− 2(Γ + δ1)− 1) .
From (A.38) we have
sup
R2
|K3,ε −K3| ≤ ε
3
.
We then define for any y, δ1, δ2 ∈ R the approximated Hamiltonian Hε by
Hε(y, δ1, δ2) := maxε
{
K1(y, δ1),K2(y, δ1),K3,ε(y, δ1)
}
+
σ2
2
δ2 + (λ− σ
2
2
− µ(ey))δ1 .
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We therefore get from (A.37)
sup
R3
|Hε −H| ≤ ε .
We then turn the PDE driven by Hε that writes{
−∂twε −Hε
(
y, ∂ywε(t, y), ∂yywε(t, y)
)
= 0 , (t, y) ∈ [0, T )× R ,
wε(T, y) = −f(ey) , y ∈ R .
(A.39)
Under Assumption (H’), we can write the approximated Hamiltonian H3,ε under the form
H3,ε(y, δ1, δ2) = σ
2
2
δ2 + bε(u, δ1)δ1 + cε(y, δ1)
where the coefficients bε and cε satisfy Conditions A, B and D of [22]. Then, according to
Theorem 14 in [22], PDE (A.39) admits a unique solution wε ∈ C2+ν([0, T ]× R).
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